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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the recent United States experience with sustained
budget deficits and concludes that the events of the last five years cast
significant doubt on the proposition that the timing of taxes does not affect
national savings. Rather than raising private saving, the recent deficits have
if anything coincided with reduced saving and increased consumption. These
findings suggest that realistic analysis of fiscal policies must recognize that
consumers are liquidity constrained and/or myopic.
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(617) 253—6673 (617) 495-2447At least since Ricardo, economists have wrestled with the dual questions of
whether or not government bonds represent net wealth, and whether government
deficits affect national savings. The answers are far from obvious. James
Tobin (1952) asked rhetorically, "How is it possible that society merely by the
device of incurring a debt to itself can deceive itself into believing that it
is wealthier? Do not the additional taxes which are necessary to carry the
interest charges reduce the value of other components of private wealth? There
must certainly be effects in this direction." While Tobin (1980) concluded
these effects are small, the economic effects of government indebtedness remain
controversial.
The controversy persists in large part because history has provided few
satisfactory experiments for assessing the Ricardian equivalence proposition.
Most historical fluctuations in budget deficits have been associated with wars,
cyclical fluctuations in the level of economic activity, or changes in govern-
ment spending. Since each of these factors directly affects national savings
and interest rates, it has proved extremely difficult to evaluate the separate
impact of changes in the timing of tax collections.
The American experience of the last five years provides an unprecedented
experiment for evaluating the impact of changes in budget deficits. Peacetime
deficits have deviated more than ever before from what would be predicted on the
basis of cyclical conditions and inflation. This paper evaluates the results of
this experiment. While the data are not wholly free of ambiguity, they are
unfavorable to the Ricardian position and support the view that government defi-
cits have a substantial impact on national savings.—2—
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I briefly reviews a
number of theoretical considerations suggesting that the effects of deficits on
national savings cannot be resolved on a priori grounds and must be examined
empirically. Section II assesses the impact of recent deficits on national
savings and on the share of national income devoted to consumption. Section III
uses Euler equation tests and data on legislated but not yet implemented tax
changes to examine the importance of liquidity constraints and myopia in con-
sumption behavior. There is a brief conclusion.
I.Theoretical Considerations
The Ricardian equivalence proposition as enunciated by Barro (1974) holds
that changes in the timing of tax collections do not affect the level of nation-
al savings. Such timing changes do not alter the consumers' budget constraint,
which depends only on the present value of future tax collections, and are
therefore presumed not to affect consumption decisions. The most common the-
oretical rejoinder to this argument recognizes that actual consumers have finite
lifetimes, so deferring taxes to the point where they impact on subsequent
generations has real effects. While this is correct as a matter of principle,
Poterba and Summers (1986) present evidence suggesting that the distinction bet-
ween overlapping generations and infinite horizon models may be of little prac-
tical importance for evaluating the short run savings impact of budget deficits.
Because the marginal propensity to consume out of changes in lifetime wealth is
small, and because realistic tax policies shift relatively small burdens to sub-
sequent generations, deficits induce relatively small consumption effects in
lifecycle models.—3-.
It does not follow, however, that simple infinite horizon models can
reliably predict the effects of alternative budgetary policies. These models
may be unrealistic in a number of empirically important ways which cause the
Ricardian equivalence proposition to fail. We consider four possibilities.
First, some consumers are liquidity constrained. In this case changes
government debt policies, which in effect allow consumers to borrow by defer
taxes, will affect consumption behavior.1 The available evidence generally
suggests that liquidity constraints are of some empirical importance. Hubbard
and Judd (1986) cite recent survey evidence indicating that the median holding
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require increases in future taxes will reduce private uncertainty about income,
thereby leading to reduced precautionary savings and increased consumption. We
are skeptical of the importance of this argument. It predicts that large an-
ticipated reductions in marginal tax rates should increase private savings.3
As we shall demonstrate below, savings have if anything declined since the
discussion of rate—reducing tax reforms in 1981 and again in 1984.
A final possibility is that the configuration of growth and interest rates
is such that the government need never raise future taxes to pay for increases
in its indebtedness.4 If consumers anticipate that this is the case, they will
treat government debt at least in part as net wealth and government deficits
will reduce national savings. Unless deficits are expected to persist over long
horizons, however, this effect will not be large. The analysis in the preceding
section indicates that the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is quite
low even for consumers with finite horizons.
These considerations suggest that evaluation of the Ricardian equivalence
proposition is ultimately an empirical matter. Unfortunately, until recently,
history has provided relatively few powerful tests of this proposition. Fluc-
tuations in budget deficits in the United States have been small except during
wartime periods, and wars are difficult to interpret because the government
affects the composition of economic activity through many channels besides its
direct claim on tax revenues. In contrast, recent events in the United States
provide a valuable experiment for testing the empirical realism of the Ricardian
equivalence proposition. We now turn to a description of this experiment, and
an evaluation of the results.—5-
II. Recent Movements in Deficits and Savings
Figure 1 presents annual information on two measures of the federal deficit
in the post-war period. The dotted line shows the ratio of the deficit as
measured in the National Income and Product Accounts to full—employment GNP,
while the solid line corresponds to an inflation- and cycle-adjusted deficit
measure, again as a fraction of full-employment GNP. Our inflation adjustment
subtracts lr*B from the measured deficit, where n is the fourth quarter-to-fourth
quarter inflation rate and B is the stock of nominal debt outstanding at the
beginning of the year. The annual deficit data are presented in the appendix.
Both deficit measures increase substantially in recent years. The cyclically
and inflation-adjusted deficit averaged 2.23 percent of GNP over the 1981-85
period. The second highest five year interval was 1966-70, when it averaged
.61 percent of full-employment output.
Recent deficit behavior appears aberrant by historical standards. While
the deficit never exceeded 4 percent of GNP between World War II and 1981, it
has exceeded that level in each of the last four years. This increase in defi-
cits is not easily attributed to changes in economic conditions. Drawing on a
theory of optimal public finance, Robert Barro (1986) uses data for the period
through 1982 to develop a simple predictive equation for debt growth. Assuming
for simplicity that actual and expected inflation coincide, Barro's equation
substantially underpredicts recent debt movements, as shown below:5
Real Debt Growth (Percent Per Year)
Year Predicted Actual Difference
1984 5.7 14.1 8.4
1985 4.8 13.2 8.4
1986 4.6 10.6 6.0
Since the in—sample standard error of Barro's equation is 2.3 percent per year,































































































































































































































The sustained budget deficits of recent years represent one of the best
experiments for testing Ricardian equivalence that history has ever provided.6
As Barro (1986) demonstrates, there are no comparable large and sustained defi-
cit movements (except in wartime) in the United States. In his recent study of
deficit experience in Great Britain, Barro (1987) considers two peacetime defi-
Cit episodes. Neither is completely satisfactory. In one case, debt was issued
to finance one-shot transfers to West Indian slaveowners. Since the recipients
of this spending were not located in Britain, however, this episode may have
different real effects than a debt-financed transfer to domestic residents. In
the other, Barro considers the deficit associated with failure to pass the
Income Tax Act of 1909. This deficit as a fraction of GNP was only half the
size of recent U.S. deficits, and it was much less persistent.
On the Ricardian equivalence view, the effect of budget deficits on savings
depends on their source. Tax changes that are not associated with changes in
the path of government spending should have no impact on national savings and
should therefore change private savings dollar for dollar. The same should hold
for permanent changes in government spending. In contrast, transitory changes
in government spending would be expected to reduce national savings because they
reduce consumers endowments by a negligible amount and therefore do not affect
private savings.
The data presented in Table 1 shed light on the extent to which recent def-
icits are due to changes in government spending that can plausibly be regarded
as transitory. For the five years since 1981, government spending on goods and
services was lower than in the preceding five year period, though it rose bet-
ween 1983 and 1985. A primary cause is the decline in taxes net of transfers.Table 1
Federal Government Sepnding, Taxes, and Transfers, 1960-85
Federal Spending andRevenueasa Percentageof Full-Employment GNP
Purchases of Goods Taxes Net of Transfers
and Services Plus NetInterest and Subsidies to
Year Intergovernmental Grants Payments Government Enterprises
1960 10.76 1.20 12.51
1961 11.12 1.07 11.53
1962 11.76 1.10 12.17
1963 11.63 1.14 12.82
1964 11.44 1.19 12.14
1965 11.23 1.18 12.47
1966 12.47 1.21 13.43
1967 13.43 1.21 13.02
1968 13.46 1.28 14.06
1969 12.46 1.32 14.66
1970 11.67 1.34 11.83
1971 11.16 1.20 10.45
1972 11.49 1.15 11.26
1973 10.73 1.31 11.63
1974 10.37 1.34 10.99
1975 10.52 1.32 7.86
1976 10.34 1.40 8.94
1977 10.45 1.39 9.64
1978 10.36 1.52 10.60
1979 9.96 1.64 10.98
1980 10.17 1.83 9.90
1981 10.04 2.20 10.30
1982 9.95 2.36 8.24
1983 9.74 2.48 7.60
1984 10.08 2.88 8.72
1985 10.73 3.09 9.13
Five-Year
Averages:
1961—65 11.44 1.14 12.23
1966-70 12.70 1.27 13.40
1971—75 10.85 1.26 10.44
1976-80 10.26 1.56 10.01
1981-85 10.11 2.60 8.80
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Table 32. Full employment GNP
data were provided courtesy of Data Resources, Inc.—7—
An additional factor in the increase in budget deficits is the increase in
government interest payments caused by reduced net tax collections during the
early 1980s. The Ricardian equivalence proposition therefore predicts that
public dissaving should, at least to some extent, have been offset by increased
private saving. In contrast, the traditional view of government deficits pre-
dicts that private savings should not have increased and that national savings
should have declined sharply.
We examine the savings response to recent deficits using several measures
of savings. Table 2 presents five year averages of eight different measures of
the allocation of resources between savings and consumption. The accompanying
figures plot the annual data, which are tabulated in the appendix. The first
row reports the national savings rate, which includes government as well as pri-
vate saving.7 It declines by a factor of two in the last decade, from just
under seven percent of GNP during the 1970s to only 3.35 percent in the 1981-5
period. The 1970s also show a slightly lower savings rate than earlier periods.
The next two rows focus on measures of private savings based on the
National Income Accounts. Row two shows the NIPA private savings rate, while
row three presents an inflation-adjusted version of this series. These measures
of the savings rate were relatively low by historical standards in the early
1980s. Inflation-adjusted private saving was only 5.1. percent of GNP in the
last five years, down from 6.5 percent during the 1970s and even higher previous
levels. There is no evidence that private savings increased in response to the
deficits of the 1980s.
There are both conceptual and measurement problems with the NIPA savings
rate.8 We therefore examine less standard measures of the savings rate as well.Table 2




1961-65 1966—70 1971-75 1976—80 1981—85
Net National
Savings/GNP 7.29 7.88 7.67 7.31 6.67 3.35
Net Private




Saving/GNP 6.40 7.54 7.05 7.10 5.86 5.06
Net National
Savi ngs/GNP
(Flow of Funds) 6.96 7.26 6.58 6.39 6.93 3.85
Net Private
Savi rigs/ONP
(Flow of Funds) 7.35 7.66 7.21 7.87 8.06 7.12
Change in Real
Household Net
Worth/GNP 10.23 12.88 5.24 3.02 15.43 7.22
Consumption/GNP 63.78 63.05 62.09 62.47 62.96 64.53
Nondurable and
Service Con-
sumption/GNP 55.20 54.60 53.29 53.66 54.11 56.11
Source: All data are drawn from National Income Accounts except for the Change
in Real Household Net Worth, which is found in the Federal Reserve
Board's Balance Sheets of the U.S. Economy, and the inflation-
adjustment to saving, which subtracts the fourth quarter-to-fourth
quarter change in the GNP deflator times the net financial assets of
the household sector (excluding corporate equities) from NIPA net
private saving.*A ut WI.
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The fourth row reports the Flow of Funds national savings rate. It is inferred
from the increases in asset stocks rather than from the difference between
income and outlays as in NIPA. One important difference between the two is the
inclusion of consumer durables expenditure as savings in the Flow of Funds
accounts. DeLeeuw (1984) shows that because of measurement problems, the Flow
of Funds private savings rate (presented in row five) exceeds the NIPA private
rate. Both measures decline in recent years.
A major conceptual problem with all the savings measures considered so far
is that they ignore capital gains and losses. One might expect that savings
measured as the change in household wealth would appear very robust during the
1980s given the strong performance of the stock market. Surprisingly, this is
not the case. The data in row six of Table 2 reveal that the savings rate
inclusive of capital gains and losses, computed as the change in real household
net worth divided by GNP, was below its historic average in the early 1980s.
This savings rate was 7.2 percent for the 1981-85 period, compared with 9.2 per-
cent during the 1970s. While savings measured inclusive of capital gains are
very volatile and so inference is difficult, it appears that unmeasured gains do
not explain the decline in the official private savings rate. Moreover, these
calculations assume that government debt represents net wealth. If we do not
treat the increase in the privately held public debt as representing wealth, the
savings rate over the 1981—1985 period averaged only 2.7 percent compared with
7.2 percent during the 1970s.
A final indicator of savings behavior is the share of consumption in GNP.
Unlike the savings measures just considered, this ratio is essentially indepen-
dent of the measurement of depreciation. The last two rows of Table 5 show the-9—
ratio of total consumption, and of the consumption of ncn—durables and services,
to GNP. We distinguish the two concepts because outlays on consumer durables
are in an important sense a form of savings. Both measures of consumption
peaked relative to GNP in the early 1980s, corroborating our earlier evidence
that savings has declined. The total consumption-to-GNP ratio was 64.5 percent,
compared with an average of 62.8 percent during the 1970s and 62.5 percent in
the 1960s. Similar patterns emerge from the durables-exciusive consumption
measure.
The observation that national savings and even private savings have fallen
as budget deficits have risen need not falsify the Ricardian equivalence
hypothesis. It is logically possible that increased deficits raised private
savings, keeping national savings constant, but that other larger shocks caused
national savings to decline. The difficulty is in identifying plausible shocks
that could have led to significant increases in the private savings rate. One
such explanation, consistent with Ricardian equivalence, is that expectations of
future income growth increased. This does not seem very plausible. The recent
performance of productivity has been very disappointing relative to prior expec-
tations. Although 1985 was a recovery year, for example, productivity in the
non-farm business sector did not increase at all. Since changes in the rate of
productivity growth dwarf other determinants of long-run income prospects, the
basis for optimism is unclear. One type of explicit evidence on future income
expectations is the long-range macroeconomic forecast history of economic fore-
casting firms. DRI, for example, periodically produces long term forecasts.
The implied ten-year growth rate in the 1978 forecast was 3.5 percent. In their
1980 forecast it was 3.1 percent, 3.2 percent in 1982, 2.9 percent in 1984, and-10-
2.6 percent in 1986. This evidence also contradicts the view that growth expec-
tations have improved.
As a way of further investigating the recent decline in national savings,
we estimated equations relating the savings measures in Table 2 to a trend, four
lagged values of GNP growth, and a dummy variable set equal to one for the
post-1981 period. In alternative specifications, we added lagged rates of
unemployment, inflation (measured using the GNP deflator) and lagged stock
market returns as additional explanatory variables. By examining the coef-
ficients on the post—1981 dummy variable, we can determine whether economic con-
ditions, apart from deficits, can account for the low national savings rates of
recent years. The results are presented in Table 3. They indicate that rel-
atively little of the recent reduction in national savings can be explained by
cyclical conditions, inflation or the behavior of the stock market. In most
cases, the post-1981 dummy is statistically significant, and it typically
suggests a national savings decline of 2.5 percent of GNP.
While it is difficult to isolate factors that could have outweighed the
effects of budget deficits and caused the savings rate to decline, it is easy to
identify considerations that might have raised the savings rate. Most
obviously, real interest rates at all maturities appear to have increased
substantially in recent years. Unless these increases were caused by shocks
that also increased future income prospects, they would have been expected to
increase private savings. In addition, changes in tax rules that were enacted
in 1981 should have had a positive impact on savings. The behavior of the priv-
ate savings rate in the face of the clearest Ricardian experiment in the last
half century should shift the burden of proof to those who believe that changes
in the timing of tax collections do not affect private savings.—11—
III. Anticipated Tax Cuts: Evidence of Liquidity Constraints and/or Myopia?
The 1981 tax cut provides a useful test of Ricardian equivalence, not only
because it dramatically lowered personal taxes, but also because it was
announced in advance and implemented gradually. With non-myopic, non-liquidity
constrained consumers, its implementation should not have had any effect on con-
sumption. Following in the tradition of Hall (1978), we test these predictions
by maintaining the hypothesis that per capita consumption evolves as a random
walk with innovations that are unpredictable given lagged information. As Hall
demonstrates, this theory can be tested by examining the correlation between
consumption innovations and any lagged variable. To maximize power against the
alternative hypothesis of interest here -—thatconsumption is affected by poli-
cies that affect the timing of tax collections --weuse as lagged variables a
measure of the impact of pre-announced tax policies.
We measure these policy shocks for the recent tax reforms using data from
Ziemer (1985), who estimates the effect of the statutory changes enacted in
1981, 1982 and 1984 on tax collections and withholding assuming they had no
impact on economic behavior. His measure thus captures the exogenous component
of the policy changes on budget deficits. We also use unpublished Department of
Commerce data on the impact of three earlier tax changes, those in 1964, 1968,
and 1975. The tax shock in 1968 was due to the Vietnam War surcharge for the
1968:3-1970:3 period. It was an explicitly temporary tax change. In 1975, we
focus on the one-time rebate that occurred in 1975:2. We do not consider the
long—run effects of the 1975 rate changes, which are analyzed in Blinder (1981).
The remaining tax change, the 1964 cut, was similar to the current reform inTable 3
Post—1981 Changes in Savings After Adjustment For Economic Conditions
Control Variables for EconomicConditions
Lagged GNP
Lagged GNP Growth and Lagged GNP
Lagged GNPGrowth and StockUnemployment Growth and
Savings Concept Growth Market Returns Rate Inflation Rates
Net National -3.34 -3.29 -1.92 -3.24
Savings/GNP (0.92) (1.28) (0.95) (1.03)
Net National
Savings (Flow —2.39 —3.49 -1.83 -2.10










Nondurables and 2.50 2.57 1.25 2.44
Services/GNP (0.63) (1.03) (0.60) (1.34)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The reported coefficients
correspond to a post-1981 dummy variable in the equation
SAVEt =a0+G1TIMEt+a2DUM8lt+(L)AlnGNPt...i+y(L)xt_i+Ct
where X denotes either stock market returns, inflation, or the
unemployment rate. See text for further details.-12-
enacting across-the-board reductions in personal taxes and marginal tax rates.
The law took effect beginning in 1964:1. We set our tax change measure equal to
the law's effects in each quarter of 1964 and 1965, but to zero thereafter.
This decision to truncate the effects after two years is arbitrary, but the
results are insensitive to minor changes.9
The consumption Euler equation we estimate is of the form:
C =a+ *c1 + y*Atax64 + I *Atax68 + y*Atax75 + 7*Atax8l +
where each Atax variable is comprised of information available as of period t-1.
We adopt the convention that Atax is positive when the tax change reduces tax
payments; this means Atax corresponds to the increment to disposable income.
We estimate this equation separately for non-durable consumption, consump-
tion of services, and total consumption. We also use two tax variables, one the
change in total per capita personal tax and nontax receipts, and the other the
change in per capita tax withholding. Although either variable can be used to
test the null hypothesis, the withholding variable probably has more power since
taxpayers whose taxes are withheld seem more likely to be liquidity constrained
than do those who pay estimated tax. For the 1975 tax rebate, we use the same
variable (the actual rebate) for both tax measures.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. They tend to reject the
premise of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. The coefficients on the tax
variables are all positive, indicating that when tax collections were reduced by
tax legislation consumption increased abnormally. This is true even though the
tax changes were all anticipated. In most cases we can reject the hypothesis
that )' =0at the .05 significance level, while in others, we reject atTable 4
ConsumptionResponses to Pre-Announced Tax Changes
Consumption
Measure Tax Measure Constant C,
Tax ReformEpisode
2

























































All Withholding 12.03 1.002 0.402 0.150 0.349 0.1341.79.999
Consumption (21.32)(0.003)(0.161)(0.272)(0.218)(0.051)
All Total Personal 12.98 1.002 0.462 0.121 0.351 0.1081.80.999
Consumption Taxes (21.31)(0.003)(0.183)(0.208)(0.217)(0.041)
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. All equations are estimated using season-
ally adjusted, quarterly, per capita consumption data for the period 1947:1—1986:2.
Further details can be found in the text. The basic estimating equation is:
Ct= a+13*c 1 + y*tax64+y*tax5B+y3*tax7f
+y4*Atax8ltCt.
Furtherdetails are provided in the text.—1.3-
somewhatlower levels. Only the 1969 tax surcharge has a statistically insigni-
ficant effect.
The estimated consumption effects are also substantively important inmany
equations. For total consumption, for example, the withholding variable appli-
cable to recent tax policy changes implies that an anticipated change of one
dollar in tax withholding generates a 13.4C change in consumption within the
quarter of the tax change beyond what would have been predicted using lagged
consumption. For personal taxes the effect is smaller (1O.8) but still non-
trivial. The earlier tax reforms are estimated to have even larger short-run
consumption effects. These results corroborate the earlier evidence that the
tax reductions of the early ].980s significantly increased consumption and
thereby reduced national savings. They also support the findings of Wilcox
(1987) that anticipated tax policies such as the payment of refunds affect con-
sumption.
We also examined the residuals from our consumption equations to see if
they were correlated with the announcements of tax policy. We found little evi-
dence along these lines. For the last quarter of 1980 and the first three quar-
ters of 1981 for example, the residuals were actually negative even though
consumers learned of the massive 1981 tax cut during this time period. Earlier
announcement periods also yielded statistically insigificant effects. This may
be evidence of myopia since the implementation of the tax cuts did affect con-
sumption, even though its announcement did not.10—14-
IV. Conclusions
The recent American deficit experience represents a natural experiment for
testing the Ricardian equivalence proposition. It provides clear evidence of a
decline in national savings in the face of increased federal deficits, and
direct evidence that preannounced tax policies affect consumption spending at
the time of implementation. It is noteworthy that recent high U.S. deficits
have coincided with unprecedented real interest rates as predicted by tradi-
tional (non-Ricardian) theories. The large real appreciation in the dollar and
the associated trade deficit provide further support for the traditional view of
the economic effects of deficits.
While we are aware of no interpretation of recent the experience that con-
vincingly reconciles it with the Ricardian equivalence view, our conclusions are
inconsistent with a significant body of work which has used historical data to
support that view. In large part this is because historical data do not contain
the information necessary to evaluate the Ricardian equivalence theory. Since
most previous changes in U.S. budget deficits are associated with cyclical fluc-
tuations, inflation, or wars, and since these factors all act directly on both
nominal and real interest rates as well as national savings rates, it is dif-
ficult to use observed fluctuations in deficits to evaluate the validity of
Ricardian equivalence. The failure of empirical efforts such as Evans (1985,
1986, 1987), Plosser (1982), and the studies surveyed in Seater (1985) to relate
the exogenous component of deficits to interest rates is not surprising, since
this component is likely to be measured very imprecisely. Furthermore, the
observation that real interest rates frequently fail to rise during wars, when-15-
nearly all theories predict that they should, suggests that these findings may
tell us more about our ignorance concerning interest rate determination than












2.Hayashi (1985) and Hall (1987) survey recent work on consumption and
liquidity constraints. Of particular importance for historical studies of
government deficits, Delong and Summers (1986) suggest that liquidity
constraints were extremely important in the pre-war United States as one would
expect given the volatility of income and the absence of well developed capital
markets.
and lowered as part of the deficit
intertemporal substitution on the part of
by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
4. In the simplest models, this will occur only if
rate exceeds the steady state interest rate and the
ficient. However, perpetual debt issue is possible
economies if government debt provides non-pecuniary
taxes on capital income.
5.The equation we use in predicting real debt growth, taken from Barro
(1986, p. 387), is
DB —it = -.15+2.8*U
where 08 denotes the percentage change in the nominal debt stock held by the
public, itisthe inflation rate, and U is the aggregate unemployment rate.
Barro reports somewhat better performance for his equation for 1983 and 1984
based on what seem in retrospect to be unreasonably high values of expected
inflation. The predicted values in the table should be increased by one percen-
tage point for each point by which the reader thinks predicted inflation exceeds
actual inflation. For 1984 and 1985, we use the annual average unemployment
rates of 7.4 and 7.1 percent in our calculations. For 1986, we use the
Congressional Budget Office (1986) forecast of an annual unemployment rate of
7.0 percent, as well as their estimates of outstanding federal debt, in our text
calculations.
6. It has been suggested that since the 1964 tax cut was roughly as large as
the 1981 tax cut, it is also useful in evaluating Ricardian equivalence. This
argument is not valid. For issues of Ricardian equivalence, changes in the
level of tax collections, not changes in tax rules, are of central importance.
As the appendix illustrates, the deficit effects of the 1964 reform were much
smaller than those from the 1981 tax change.
7.To the extent that federal deficits have been offset by state and local
surpluses in recent years, their coincidence with declining national savings
is all the more surprising.
(1985) raises the possibility that if liquidity constraints
adverse selection effects, Ricardian equivalence could still
policies affect the nature of consumers borrowing constraints
not valid if liquidity constraints are caused by limitations
consumers to borrow because of enforcement problems created by
laws and other protections accorded to debtors.
3. If distortionary taxes are raised
program, the path of taxes may induce
consumers. These effects are analyzed
the steady state growth
economy is dynamically inef-
in dynamically efficient
services or if there are—17—
8. The most important problems involve unmeasured capital inflows which cause
increases in assets to be falsely imputed to the household sector, and the
underground economy which may lead to underestimates of disposable income. See
DeLeeuw (1984) for a thorough discussion.
9. These data, which are similar to those Ziemer (1985) reports for the
post-1981 tax reforms, were provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
data series for the 1975 tax change is published in Blinder (1981), while the
1968 data may also be found in Okun (1971).
10. Aschauer (1985) examines Euler equations like those estimated here and
argues that rejection of Ricardian equivalence occurs only because of the
failure to include some of government spending in private consumption. He does
not include variables of the type considered here in his tests.In results not
reported here, we re—estimated his system (15) including our Max variables in
the consumption Euler equation. The null hypothesis of zero effect for these
tax variables is rejected at the .10 level.-18-
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Behavior of Federal Deficits, 1960-1985




Actual Adjusted Adjusted Inflation—Adjusted
Year Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
1960 -0.53 —0.84 —1.01 -1.32
1961 0.66 0.02 0.21 -0.43
1962 0.68 0.67 —0.19 —0.20
1963 -0.05 0.05 —0.46 -0.37
1964 0.49 0.98 0.00 0.49
1965 -0.07 0.97 -1.00 0.04
1966 0.24 1.89 —0.93 0.72
1967 1.63 3.04 0.96 2.36
1968 0.68 2.29 -0.75 0.86
1969 -0.87 0.41 —2.15 —0.87
1970 1.17 1.03 0.10 -0.05
1971 1.91 1.46 0.70 0.25
1972 1.35 1.25 0.48 0.38
1973 0.41 0.98 —1.16 -0.58
1974 0.75 0.59 —0.92 -1.09
1975
• 3.97 2.54 2.68 1.25
1976 2.80 1.99 1.76 0.94
1977 2.20 2.04 0.87 0.71
1978 1.27 1.96 —0.33 0.36
1979 0.62 1.40 —1.12 —0.34
1980 2.10 2.07 0.27 0.24
1981 1.94 1.69 0.32 0.07
1982 4.07 2.47 3.07 1.47
1983 4.64 3.32 3.82 2.51
1984 4.23 4.15 3.32 3.23
1985 4.69 4.81 3.74 3.87
Five-Year
Averages:
1961-65 0.34 0.54 —0.29 -0.09
1966-70 0.57 1.73 -0.55 0.61
1971-75 1.68 1.36 0.36 0.04
1976-80 1.80 1.89 0.29 0.38
1981—85 3.91 3.29 2.85 2.23
Source: Actual deficits are drawn from the National Income Accounts. Cyclically
adjusted deficits and full-employment GNP were provided courtesy of DPI.
Inflation-adjustment subtracts the Q4 to Q4 change in the GNP deflator,
times the outstanding debt stock at the end of the previous year, from
the measured deficit (note deficits aremeasuredas positive values).Appendix Table A-2






Year Savings/GNP Savings/GNP Savings,'GNP Savings/GNP
1950 10.02 7.25 3.98 NA
1951 9.45 7.62 5.93 NA
1952 6.57 7.65 6.12 8.47
1953 5.41 7.29 7.50 7.74
1954 5.13 7.06 5.59 7.65
1955 8.38 7.59 5.88 7.47
1956 9.15 7.94 6.03 7.84
1957 7.98 7.76 6.53 7.54
1958 4.75 7.51 6.63 7.51
1959 7.24 7.56 6.61 7.54
1960 7.34 6.73 6.20 6.21
1961 6.52 7.31 6.81 6.91
1962 7.31 7.97 7.03 7.77
1963 7.79 7.66 7.22 7.09
1964 8.40 8.76 8.25 8.23
1965 9.37 9.30 8.37 8.33
1966 8.83 9.00 7.85 8.49
1967 7.61. 9.36 8.69 6.59
1968 7.37 8.04 6.63 7.23
1969 8.03 7.00 5.73 5.37
1970 6.49 7.45 6.33 6.38
1971 6.75 8.44 7.18 7.37
1972 7.65 7.87 6.98 7.77
1973 9.84 9.26 7.68 8.48
1974 7.50 7.93 6.17 7.29
1975 4.81 8.87 7.46 8.42
1976 5.82 7.98 6.85 8.24
1977 6.73 7.69 6.29 7.31
1978 7.94 7.96 6.32 7.80
1979 7.68 7.1.8 5.38 8.79
1980 5.17 6.39 4.44 8.17
1981 5.71 6.64 4.89 7.45
1982 2.00 5.49 4.36 7.02
1983 1.97 5.74 4.84 6.42
1984 4.20 6.90 5.92 7.91
1985 2.86 6.27 5.27 6.78
Note: See text for data description.Appendix Table A-2, Continued
Flow of Funds Changein Nondurable and
National HouseholdNet Consumption! Service Con-
Year Savings/GNP Worth/GNP GNP sumption/GNP
1950 NA 20.54 65.63 55.98
1951 NA 19.21 62.42 53.45
1952 7.03 6.97 62.32 53.98
1953 5.61 8.33 62.59 53.79
1954 5.57 21.56 64.38 55.76
1955 7.84 16.30 63.54 53.95
1956 8.54 8.87 63.19 54.27
1957 7.41 —6.83 63.26 54.46
1958 4.63 29.57 64.49 56.35
1959 6.80 8.96 63.80 55.16
1960 6.52 4.54 64.18 55.73
1961 5.72 25.36 63.90 56.05
1962 6.95 -10.05 62.98 54.80
1963 7.21 18.68 62.89 54.37
1964 7.91 16.45 62.99 54.25
1965 8.50 13.97 62.50 53.51
1966 8.70 -2.89 61.83 52.95
1967 7.00 25.99 61.69 53.03
1968 6.13 18.71 61.89 52.81
1969 5.74 —13.08 62.03 53.08
1970 5.35 —2.55 63.02 54.58
1971 5.04 12.04 62.72 53.87
1972 7.07 17.09 62.47 53.30
1973 8.84 —11.87 61.59 52.42
1974 6.85 -14.56 62.23 53.83
1975 4.15 12.41 63.36 54.89
1976 5.81 19.85 63.34 54.29
1977 6.31 8.96 63.16 53.89
1978 7.35 15.91 62.39 53.25
1979 8.58 16.41 62.47 53.74
1980 6.61 16.01 63.42 55.39
1981 5.99 0.13 62.74 54.88
1982 3.33 —3.12 64.77 56.79
1983 2.19 19.90 65.61 57.12
1984 4.78 6.89 64.49 55.70
1985 2.94 12.32 65.04 56.06
Note: See text for data description.